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ABSTRACT
During the period since World War II the US. economy has ex-
perienced four temporary recessions, Although the postwar recessions
have been brief and mild by standards of the 1930's, interruptions of
any magnitude in our national economic growth are cause for concern.
All four of these recessions brought — with varying degrees of timeli-
ness and effectiveness -- attempts by the federal government to take
corrective action through the use of fiscal and monetary policy. Parti-
cular antirecession fiscal and monetary actions can be better orworse
with respect to effectiveness, timing, efficiency and compatibility with
other goals, and some of the policies pursued in the past have been
worse rather than better.
This paper investigates the character and uses of fiscal and mone-
tary policy and the related public debt creation as federal antirecession-
ary weapons
. Chapter I constitutes an introduction to the paper . Fiscal
policy, monetary policy and the public debt are discussed in Chapters
II, III and IV respectively. In Chapters V and VI the recessions of 19 53^
54 and 19 57-58 are examined in detail with emphasis on an evaluation of
the timeliness and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary actions. Chapter
VII offers some conclusions concerning the possible choices of fiscal
and monetary actions for future recessions and conclusions concerning
the avoidance of recession and maintenance of progressive economic
growth
,
Chapters I, II, V and VII were prepared by Lieutenant John E,
Wildman, and Chapters III, IV and VI were prepared by Lieutenant Com-
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Modern economics undertakes to explain, among other things, h w
it is that nations are alternatively afflicted with the ups and downs of
business activity. In the pre-Industrial Revoluation days, before the de-
velopment of our present technology, there were often periodic famines ,
Statistical data showed that the number of marriages moved inversely with
the price of bread -- when bread became dear, mairiages had to be post-
poned. Millions of people died as a result of floods , droughts, plaque,
locust invasions or other easily recognized natural catastrophes. The
causes of such disasters were well known, but nobody could do much
about them
,
Today the situation is just the opposite. We now know how to pro-
duce a fair abundance of goods, but we are subject to periodic depres-
sions of obscure causation. Bread is cheap in depression, and marriages
today follow job opportunities rather than the cost of food. Famine re-
sulting from crop failure in one part of the world can now be relieved by
shipments from elsewhere. And in an apparently topsy turvy world people
go hungry in modern economic slumps, not because we can produce too
2
little, but seemingly because we can produce too much .
Members of our senior generations bear scares of the Great De-
pression of the 1930°s , a period that has been equated with World War II
in the amount of economic resources wasted. An onlooker from an earlier
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics -An Introductory Analysis (New








century would have thought that everybody had lost their senses. Sheep
were driven into rivers to drown while families did without meat,, Because
we had efficient new factories, we did without production. With too many
skilled and willing hands unemployment prevailed. People tried to save
and hoard money with the result that they got poorer and poorer,
The history of the business cycle including the Great Depression
has prompted economists to intensity efforts to understand and analyze
fluctuations in our national income. Although economics is by no means
an exact science a considerable body of knowledge has been developed ,
contributing to a neoclassical synthesis which may be partially stated as
follows: "by means of appropriately reinforcing monetary and fiscal poli-
cies , our mixed-enterprise system can avoid the excesses of boom and
3
slump and can look forward to healthy, progressive growth .
However, during the period since World War II our economy has ex-
perienced four temporary recessions. Although the post-war recessions
have been brief and mild by standards of the 1930's, interruptions of any
magnitude in our national economic growth are cause for concern. All
four of these recessions brought -- with varying degrees of timeliness
and effectiveness—attempts by the federal government to take corrective
action through the use of fiscal and monetary policy. Particular anti-
recession fiscal and monetary actions can be better or worse with respect
to effectiveness, timing, efficiency and compatibility with other goals
,
and some of the policies pursued in the past have been worse rather than
better.
It is the purpose, therefore of this paper to investigate the character
and uses of fiscal and monetary policy and the related public debt cre-





policy and public debt will be discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV
respectively
.
Furthermore, in Chapters V and VI the recessions of
1953-54 and 1957-58 will be examined in detail with emphasis on an
evaluation of the timeliness and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary
actions . Finally Chapter VII will offer some conclusions concerning
the possible choices of fiscal and monetary actions for future reces-
sion or even better to avoid recession and maintain progressive econ=






It is the purpose of this chapter to analyze the character and uses
of fiscal policy. The definition given to fiscal policy here is the policy
of the government with respect to the total amount of its own expendi-
tures
, the total amount of its taxes , and the relations between these
1
totals, which is the surplus or deficit. By a positive fiscal policy is
meant the process of shaping public taxation and public expenditure
so as (1) to help dampen down the swings of the business cycle, and
(2) to contribute toward the maintenance of a progressive, high-employ-
ment economy free from excessive inflation or deflation.
2
Federal fiscal policy has proven to be a powerful weapon, parti-
cularly in the war years — so powerful in fact that some feel that
men and governments should not be allowed to play with it, and that it
would be better if fiscal policy were never used. However, it simply
doesn't make sense to allow the business cycle to push us into reces-
sion when we have tools to dampen it. Therefore, the choice is to
attempt to lead fiscal policy along economically sound rather than de-
structive channels.
DEFLATIONARY AND INFLATIONARY GAPS
Given a deflationary gap situation in which private consumption
and investment spending were too weak to provide adequate employ-
ment, action would be called for to put into effect stabilizing policies
necessary to dampen the recessionary tendency and to bring the economy
Committee For Economic Development, Fiscal and Monetary






back to full employment. The Federal Reserve would use expansion-
ary monetary policy to try to stimulate private investment . To the ex-
tent that its efforts were not fully successful a deflationary gap would
still exist. Timely action would then be required by the government to
introduce tax and/or federal expenditure policies designed to help the
economy again achieve stable full employment. In this case a de-
crease in tax or an increase in federal expenditures would be called
for. This subject will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
FIGURE 1
DEFLATIONARY GAP
When total spending (consumption +
investment + government spending) is
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Also, given a situation in which private investment and con-
sumption decisions were threatening the economy with an inflation-
ary gap, in which prices are rising and employers are competing for
nonexistent workers, the Federal Reserve would initiate contraction^
ary credit programs aimed to dampen the inflationary tendency. Further-
more, to the extent that the inflationary gap persisted, governmental
action would be called for to increase taxes and/or decrease federal

















When prices are being bid
up and total spending is










is the vertical dis-
tance between the 45
degree line and the
C+l + G schedule at
full employment.

To summarize, it can be said that "fiscal policies dealing with
taxes and public expenditure, in cooperation with stabilizing mone-
tary policies , have for their goal a high-employment economy —- but
one without price inflation. The fiscal and monetary authorities lean
against the prevailing economic winds, thereby helping provide a
favorable economic environment within which the dynamic forces of
private initiative can have the widest opportunity for achievement.'
THE BUILT-IN STABILIZERS
It is important to note that our fiscal system is organized in such
a manner that all stabilization requirements do not necessitate dis-
cretionary action on the part of the authorities . We have built-in
stabilizers that automatically counteract unstabilizing influences on
the economy. Built-in fiscal stabilizers, as an antirecessionary tool,
might be defined as those federal receipts and expenditures which, in
response to contractions in the economy, operate in the direction of
increasing the federal deficit or decreasing the surplus without the
need for policy decision or action. The major stabilizers fitting this
definition are the individual and corporate income taxes, excise taxes
employment taxes and unemployment benefit payments. Other built-
in stabilizers that might be mentioned are various governmental aid
programs such as aid to farmers and even personal and corporate sav-
ings to the extent that they are spent on consumption and investment
and therefore produce a cushioning effect.
To illustrate the effect of built-in stabilizers it is easy to see
that as soon as income begins to decrease the federal tax receipts






to go up. In other words the built-in fiscal stabilizers help support
the economy in recession mainly by reducing the rate at which an
initial decrease in demand and in earned income before tax tends to
have a multiplier effect on the economy by inducing further declines in
expenditures for personal consumption. For example, because a drop
in income reduces tax liability (on a progressive basis) , after-tax in-
comes drop by less than if there were no decline in tax liability. It
seems intuitively clear from this that private expenditures based on
these after-tax incomes also drop by less than if there were no decline
in tax liability. Likewise, the rise in unemployment compensation in
recession cushions the decline in consumption by keeping the drop in
disposable income less then the drop in income earned. In addition to
these effects on consumption, the built-in stabilizers also cushion
potential decreases in business investment. This is done indirectly
to the extent that inventory of fixed investment is influenced by private
consumption expenditures which, as a result of the stabilizers, are more
stable then they would be otherwise. This effect results directly to the
extent that investment is influenced by current after-tax business re-
ceipts
.
It is interesting to note that the elements of the federal budget
which have automatic stabilizing effects with respect to fluctuations in
the economy, did not come into existence for this purpose. To the con-
trary, built-in stabilizer effects are an incidental benefit of legislation
4
enacted for other purposes.
GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE "MULTIPLIER"
The major weapons of discretionary fiscal policy are (1) changing
4
Wilfred Lewis, Jr. , Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar




tax rates and (2) changing government expenditure programs . Holding
tax constant, a change in federal expenditures will act on the economy
in a multiplied manner in the same way that a change in private invest-
ment acts on the economy. An increase in government expenditure will
increase national income by an amount greater than the increase itself.
This amplifier effect of government expenditure on income is called the
"multiplier" effect. The term "multiplier" is used for the numerical
coefficient showing how great an increase in income results from each
increase in government spending. The term is used most commonly in
connection with the private investment segment of national income, but
it applies also to government expenditures.
The multiplier effect is the result of a whole chain of secondary
consumption spending set in motion by primary expenditures of the
federal government for, say, polaris missiles. Those providing labor,
materials and services to build the missile will receive payments amount-
ing to the cost of the missile which for purposes of example costs, say,
$1000. These people will in turn spend part of this on new consumption
goods. The amount they spend will depend on their marginal propensity
to consume (MPC) . If their MPC is 2/3 they will spend $666,67 on new
consumption goods . The producers of these goods will then have an
extra income of $666.67, part of which they will in turn spend. If their
MPC is also 2/3, they will pass on $444.44 in new purchasing. And so
the chain of spending goes on to an aggregate of $3000 or 3 times the
primary expenditure if everyone in the chain has an MPC of 2/3. The
multiplier is numerically equal to the reciprocal of one minus MPC or
simply the reciprocal of the marginal propensity to save (MPS) , which
is one minus MPC. In the example cited the multiplier is three. The
general multiplier formula in the case of government expenditure is:

Change in income = 1 X change in government expenditure
1-MPC
1 X change in government expenditure
MPS
To demonstrate further the effect of the multiplier a graphic explana-
tion is provided below,
FIGURE 3
Given a MPS of 1/3 , which is the slope of
the savings schedule, an increase in government
spending of $10 billion will shift the government spend-
ing schedule from equilibrium at E to a new equilibrium









A tax change is the other major discretionary fiscal weapon of the
federal government . A reduction in the tax rate will mean that people
will have higher real disposable incomes which in turn means that con-
sumption spending will increase. And thus the national income will be
increased. Part of each dollar increase in disposable income, however,
is saved, and therefore, the dollar rise in initial consumption spend-
ing will not be quite as great as the decrease in taxes. For this reason
a tax change does not act quite as powerfully on the economy as does
a change in government expenditure.
In the mid 1930 °s when the government was wrestling with the
Great Depression the tendency was to initiate work on public invest-
ment programs for the unemployed. These were often hastily devised,
inefficient and trumped-up projects, but this was an attempt to use govern'
ment spending as a lever on the economy. They apparently did not con-
sider tax reduction — in fact, they tried to raise tax rates;! Since that
time there have been two wars during which government spending soared,
and it has subsequently stayed at a high level. Nowadays, however,
when stabilizing action is required considerable emphasis is placed on
tax-rate changes. One reason for this is that taxes are much larger
then they used to be, and the government would never find itself with
no more taxes to reduce rates on. Furthermore, with the large annual
federal budgets that have existed in recent years it is politically dif-
ficult to increase government spending. And finally, it is safe to say
that cutting taxes is simply a more popular public notion.
A serious drawback of tax cutting as an antirecessionary tool is
the problem of timing. To be effective as antirecessionary tools, fis-
cal actions must be timely. This is currently a serious drawback of
tax-cutting due to the fact that to change the tax rates Congressional
U

legislative action is required, and this is usually a very time con-
suming process. The proper moment for action has in all likelihood
passed before appropriate legislation is enacted.,
This is not, however, such a serious drawback on the spending
program as a fiscal tool. The President of course cannot spend more
than Congress appropriates, however, he does have considerable lati-
tude on where and just when during a given year funds will be spent. He
can therefore shift government projects into those areas of the country
that are depressed and time the implementation of projects to the most
advantage.
The important thing is that the constraint on cutting taxes con-
fronts the government only with the alternatives of trying to raise ex-
penditures or doing nothing. A solution to the problem is to make it
possible for tax cuts to be effected rapidly. There is little doubt that
governmental action will be taken in a serious recession. Therefore,
the question raised by proposals to make tax reductions move avail-
able for use is not whether strong action should be taken. Rather, the
question is whether the possibility of action should be limited to increas-
ing government expenditures. As long as timely tax cuts are made impos-
sible by political and institutional obstacles, action against a serious re-
cession will most likely consist of larger spending. To limit the choice
of alternatives in this manner seems unnecessary and unadvisable. To
overcome this limitation one possibility that has been advocated is to
authorize the President to propose temporary tax reductions (or increases)
,
within limits as to duration and character specified by previous legisla-
tion, to take effect unless a concurrent resolution of disapproval is
adopted by Congress within 60 days. In this connection there may be
questions concerning the distribution of power between the Executive
and the Legislative branches of the government, since under this
12

recommendation inaction or favorable action by one House would
permit the President's proposal to go into effect, whereas positive
action of disapproval by both Houses would be needed to prevent
it. The advocates of the proposal, however, are not interested in
tipping the balance of power between the President and Congress
but are concerned with the government's ability to obtain a prompt
decision to effect a tax cut when needed
.
Committee For Economic Development, Fiscal and Monetary






Monetary policy, in a broad sense, concerns itself with all the
measures that can be undertaken by the government to effect the expendi-
ture or use of money by the public. Since this is such an all emcompass-
ing definition and includes the fiscal policies of the government as well,
this chapter will describe monetary policy from a much narrower view. It
will be concerned with the more traditional definition of monetary policy,
that of controlling the economy's supply of money and credit by actions
of the Federal Reserve Board. Monetary policy in this stricter sense,
therefore, focuses on the objectives, the tools, and the processes of
regulation of the supply of money and credit „
Monetary policy cannot and should not be separated from fiscal policy
but rather should be looked at as the fine control, the vernier, that is
utilized to combat inflationary/deflationary trends . Fiscal policy alone
cannot properly combat these trends because, by itself, it is entirely too
blunt; thus monetary policy complements it quite well.
Monetary policy was discarded by the government as a useful tool
in the years following the Great Depression, but since 1951 has been
relied on more and more as a major instrument for achieving the economic
goals of the United States,, As a people, we insist upon more rapid
economic growth at a more even rate, and upon relatively more stable
Neil H. Jacoby, "Contemporary Monetary Issues , " United States
Monetary Policy






prices, than was true at an earlier time. Thus monetary policy has
2become a subject of wide-spread public interest.
PURPOSE
What then is the real purpose of monetary policy? Simply stated,
it is to maintain full employment and full production, without inflation,
in a free economy, or phrased differently it functions to foster a finan-
cial climate favorable to forces of economic growth while maintaining
relatively stable prices. In our present economy enforcing these ob-
jectives often causes conflicts and, when given the choice between price
stability and other objectives, monetary officials tend to give priority to
price stability. Their rationale is that price stability promotes employ-
ment and growth in the long run . They believe that the sacrifice of price
stability in the short run will lead to unemployment and low rate of
3
economic growth in the long run. The incompatibility of these objec-
tives ha c been clearly shown by the high unemployment figures in the
so-called "good times" of the past decade.
Economic activity under modern private enterprise proceeds at an
uneven rate which appears somewhat like a sine wave with an upward
trend. When spending by the public, in relation to offerings of goods, is
resulting in inflationary demand pressures in markets generally, monetary
management has the task of restraining the expansion of bank credit and
2
Ibid.
, p. 5 .
3
James B, Ludke, The American Financial System (Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, Inc.
, 1961) ,pp. 618-619.
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money balances. When deflationary trends are evident, the task becomes
that of encouraging expansion of bank credit and money balances „ The
fact that monetary policy cannot do this perfectly in no way detracts from
its value, as a dynamic private enterprise economy needs undulation and
adaptation to maintain its dynamism.
The manner in which the Federal Reserve Roard functions to control
spending is described by Samuelson as follows (assume inflationary
trend): To put on the monetary brakes the first step is to cut down on
bank reserves. Assuming a 20 per cent reserve requirement, each dollar
contraction in bank reserves forces a 5:1 contraction in total demand de-
posits. The contraction in total money makes credit generally "tight"
,
which means both dearer and less available. With credit expensive and
hard to get, private and public investment will tend to fall. Finally the
pressure on credit and on investment spending will, through the downward
shift in the I & G (investment plus government spending) schedule, have
a downward effect on income and jobs,
THE FED'S WEAPONS
The Federal Reserve Roard relies on three interrelated instruments
to regulate the reserve base of the commercial bank system. They are:
open market operations , discount operations and changes in reserve re-
quirements. These three instruments are utilized in a complementary
fashion to change the supply of reserves and their cost to member banks.
4
Ralph a Young, "Tools and Processes of Monetary Policy," United
States Monetary Policy
,
Neil H. Tacoby, editor (New York: The American
Assembly, Columbia University, 19 58) , p. 13.
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc. , 1953) , p. 314 .
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In addition to these general weapons, the Board has a special purpose
instrument which is designed to prevent the excessive use of credit in
the stock market. This tool is called the "margin requirement „ " Under
special circumstances , such as national emergencies or exceptionally-
strong inflationary pressures, the aforementioned instruments have been
supplemented by two other selective items ~ the regulation of consumer
credit and the regulation of real estate credit.
Open market operations consist of purchases or sales of government
securities in the open market. Regardless of who may sell the securi-
ties purchased or who may buy the securities sold by the Federal Reserve
these transactions have a direct impact on the volume of member bank
reserves. Through a chain of events, the Federal Reserve's purchases
of government securities creates bank deposits as the sellers receive
payment; this increases the amount of money available for lending thus
forcing interest rates down. Conversely, when the Federal Reserve sells
securities, deposits drop as the buyers pay for the securities, and inter-
est rates tend to rise. The distinctive aspect of open market operations
is that they are undertaken at the initiative of the Federal Reserve and,
therefore, are an active reflection of the prevailing monetary policy.
These open market operations are considered to be the most important
6
stabilizing weapon used by the Federal Reserve.
The twelve Federal Reserve Banks provide banking facilities for the
member banks of the entire system
.
One of the traditionally provided
services is that of making loans. These loans are usually in the form of
Young , o p. cit. , p. 18 .
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advances on government securities and are commonly called "discounts" „
The interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve Bank is termed the dis-
count rate, and it is regulated by the Board in a manner designed to com-
bat inflationary and deflationary trends
.
Raising the discount rate makes the money market tight and discour-
ages loans, while lowering the rate has the opposite effect. When dis-
counts are dropping the Board is helping bank reserves contract and re-
ducing the economy's credit base, and conversely, when disccunts are
growing the member banks reserves are increasing and thus providing a
larger credit base. The overall effectiveness of discount operations has
never been conclusively determined although past performance suggests
that it has more usefulness as a credit control in a normal or boomtime
economy; while in a protracted depression it tends to be of little signi=
ficance.
One major drawback to this device is that the Federal Reserve Banks
must play a passive role in that, although they can change the discount
rates, they can't set the amount of discounts at any predetermined figure.
The third major tool of the Federal Reserve Board, changing reserve
requirements, is the most powerful of all. Action to change the level of
reserve requirements does not affect the amount of member bank reserve
balances, but it does affect the amount of deposits and, therefore, of
loans and investments that member banks can legally maintain on the basis
of a given amount of reserves
. Thus , according to the level of reserve
7
David H. McKinley, "The Discount Rate and Rediscount Policy,"
The Federal Reserve System
. Herbert V. Prochnow, editor (New York::





percentage requirements in effect, a given amount of reserves can be
made to do more or less bank credit and monetary work,,
Two things happen when the required reserve percentages are
changed. First, there is an immediate change in the liquid asset or
secondary reserve position of member banks and second, there is a
change in the rate of multiple expansion of deposits of the entire
banking system. Thus, if the requirements are raised, the banks that
have no excess reserves must find additional reserve funds by selling
liquid assets in the market or by borrowing from other banks or from the
Reserve Banks
.
Since changes to reserve requirement levels become effective on
some one selected date, an abrupt change in economic conditions is
often the result. If the reserve requirements were raised the banks
would have to act as described above until the new reserve requirements
were met. ^his change would result in high interest rates, unfavorable
credit, cuts in investments ^nd reductions in national income and em=
o
ployment. It is clear indeed why this powerful weapon is seldom
used.
The Federal Reserve Board also has the power to regulate stock
market credit. This control takes the form of setting "margin require-
ments. " They consist of the percentage of the value of stocks which
a buyer is expected to supply form his own resources. For example,
if the margin is 60 per cent, a bank or broker is permitted to lend the
,
buyer no more than 40 per cent of the value of the stocks given as coir
lateral. The regulation of stock market credit by the margin require-
8
Samuelson, op_. cit.
, p. 323 .
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merit, though bearing directly on the lender, puts restraint on the
borrower and thus dampens demand u The purposes of the margin re-
quirement controls are to minimize the danger of excessive use of
credit in financing stock market speculation, and to prevent the re-
currence of speculative stock market booms based on credit financ-
ing
, such as culminated in the price collapse of 1929 and the subse-
9
quent severe credit liquidation.
The Board has, in the past, had the power to control installment
and mortgage terms. With these controls they were able to control the
amount of down payment required on cars, furniture and houses „ They
also could shorten the span of mortgages. These controls proved to
be very unpopular even though quite powerful and were allowed to
lapse after the Korean War.
UTILIZING THE WEAPONS
The basic tools of the Federal Reserve do not maximize their real
effectiveness unless they are properly coordinated to meet varying
situations. Open market operations, the most flexible and often used
instrument, are the principal means of coping with short-term forces
influencing member bank reserves. Discount operations, while they
play some part in cushioning seasonal pressures on individual banks
in areas subject to open market operations in dealing with cyclical
swings in credit demand and money balances.
Open market operations is the major weapon employed to vary
the bank reserves in order to meet the economy's need for growth*
gYoung,






However, in times of economic recession, changes of reserve requirements
are sometimes used in order to gain whatever stimulative effect that mone-
tary expansion may provide. Reserve requirement levels may also be
varied in special situations where large changes in the volume of reserves,
such as result from sizable international movements of gold, need to be
offset or cushioned. The margin requirement functions as a supplement
to the bank reserve instruments.
The main cyclical work of monetary management is carried out by
complementary reliance on open market and discount operations. In a
growing economy they work together to regulate the rate of expansion of
member bank deposits and assets. In a boom period they retard the rate
of expansion whereas in periods of recession they increase the expansion
rate. Situations that require monetary action that induce an actual con^
traction in these strategic quantities seldom arise.
The impact of these monetary weapons is transmitted to the econo^
my at large via the commercial banking system. Their immediate effect
is to influence the availability and cost of credit at the commercial banks.
After a short lag, reactions from the initial impulse pervade the economy,
affecting not only borrowers and lenders but in some degree the spending
and saving decisions of all households and business enterprises that
participate in the financial process.
A graphic view of the Federal Reserved structure in relation to its
several instruments of monetary action is shown in figure 4,
Ibid.
























FALLACY OF THE BALANCED BUDGET
BALANCED BUDGET ATTITUDES
"We should make it the first principle of economic and fiscal policy
in these times to maintain a balanced budget, and to finance the cost of
national defense on a pay-as we-go basis „" Thus spoke Harry Truman
in the Economic Report of the President, in January 1951. Dwight Eisen-
hower echoed these sentiments in his State o f the Union Mes_sage_ in 1953
when he said, "The first order of business is the elimination of the annual
deficit ..„„.„.. A balanced budget is an essential first measure in check-
ing further depreciation in the buying power of the dollar" „ Why, in this
age when the goals and tools of Keynesianism are so widely accepted, do
1
we have this remarkable persistence in balanced governmental budgets?
Whatever the reasons are, they're sure to be flavored with political over-
tones .
This conservative attitude is built on the economic propositions that
deficits may encourage irresponsibility and contribute to the growth of the
public sector and that deficits may require a higher level of future tax
rates . In addition many people apparently think of the national budget in
the same manner in which they think of a household budget „ Although the
first two factors have some validity the third has none,, What then is so
sacred about a balanced budget? Is it bound to have a neutral effect on
the economy, or will it enable the economy to grow? The fact of the matter
1 Jesse Burkhead, "The Balanced Budget," Readings in Fiscal Policy,
Arthur Smithies and J. Keith Butters, editors (Homewood, Illinoisr





is that a rising balanced budget exerts a net expansionary effect on the
economy Q (see Appendix I)
A balanced budget can be neutral in its effect on the economy, and
it can, as well, be highly expansive and cause inflation, or it can be
highly restrictive and cause depression. The budget that shows a surplus,
although often regarded as being restrictive to the national economy, may
in fact be inflationary „ Conversely, a deficit budget, commonly thought
to cause the economy to expand, can in fact be restrictive. It is neces-
sary to examine the nature of expenditures and taxes before drawing any
2
conclusion as to the effect of any budget on the economy.
EXPANSIVE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURE
In order to measure the effects of federal expenditures on the economy,
it is necessary to know who receives the money, and how likely they are
to spend it. If it is received by people who will save most of it, it is much
less expansive than if it is received by people who will spend most of it.
Distinction between government transfer payments and government income-
producing payments must be made. The former represents merely a transfer
of funds from the government to individuals and does not necessarily involve
any employment or income creation. Income-producing payments, on the
other hand, represent the purchase of goods or services and thus result in
employment and income
.
Government expenditures that directly result in the production of income
such as public works and national defense expenditures are expenditures
that release income funds; expenditures that result merely in making loan-
able funds available, via augmenting the supply of capital funds through
various federal loaning activities, are expenditures that release capital funds
2
Harold M. Somers, Public Finance and National Income
(Philadelphia: Blakison, 1949), pp. 485-527
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The latter funds, if invested, will ultimately produce income, as will
transfer payments
,
if and when they are spent.
RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS OF TAXATION
Taxation involves an absorption of both capital and income funds
by the government. Sales tax and income taxes on low income groups
absorb income funds , whereas taxes that impinge on savings , absorb
capital funds. When income funds are absorbed, the consumer's expendi-
tures and thus the national income are directly affected , Absorption of
capital funds indirectly affects the national income as it tend to make the
terms for borrowing for private enterprise less attractive.
RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS OF BORROWING
At first glance borrowing looks like a matter of absorption of capital
funds by the government. However, if you consider the use the funds may
have been put to , had they not been loaned to the government
,
it appears
that income funds may have been absorbed as well„ This is particularly
true in the case of war bond programs and compulsory savings plans. Thus,
it becomes apparent that government borrowing absorbs both capital and
income funds
.
EXPANSIVE EFFECTS OF DEBT REPAYMENT
The repayment of the debt also involves both capital and income funds.
Some individuals utilize the funds they receive from bond redemptions for
purchase of securities. For others, these funds represent the culmination
of a savings program, particularly in the case of war bonds
,
and the funds
are used for consumer spending, thus the latter usage is far more expansive
than the former.
Using this dissection of the various budgetary factors, we can
now see that a deficit budget, per se, often gives a misleading picture
25

of the government's contribution to the community's income funds . Thus
the net effect of income fund release or absorption is an appropriate
measure of the government's direct contribution to the nation's purchas-
ing power.
It now follows that the net government release of income funds .rather
than the deficit, is the appropriate over-all indicator of the direct expan-
sive impact of budgetary policy. Since it is possible to have a net govern •=
ment release of income funds when the budget is balanced, it is possible
to have an expansive effect on consumption, and thus national income
,
when the budget is balanced. For example, if expenditures are $100 =
billion, made up of $75-billion release of income funds and $25-billion
release of capital funds, and if tax revenues are $100-billion, made up
of $70- billion absorption of income funds and $30-billion absorption of
capital funds, the net government release of income funds if $5-billion.
At the same time, the indirect restrictive impact is potentially $5-billion
in the form of a net absorption of capital funds . Whether this indirect
restrictive influence is actually felt depends on the state of the banking
system *nd the general availability of capital. In any case there is a
direct expansive impact of $5-billion even though the budget is balanced.
Similar expansive and contractive effects can be determined by com-
paring the net results of the government's actions on income and capital
funds utilizing both deficit and surplus budgets „ In either case it is never
the mere fact that a budget is deficit or surplus that determines the ex-
pansive or contractive force of a particular budget. It is the nature of the
funds absorbed and released that determines whether or not a particular
budget is expansive or contractive.
3
Harold M. Somers , Federal Expenditure and Economic Stability:
The Fallacy of the Balanced Rudqet, unpublished report submitted to the
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, Oct. ,1957
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By the way of a conclusion the following statement made by Evsey
D. Domar seems appropriate .
When post-war fiscal policy is discussed , the public
debt and its burden loom in the eyes of many economists
and laymen as the greatest obstacle to all good things on
earth. The remedy suggested is always the reduction of the
absolute size of the debt or at least the prevention of its
further growth. Tf all the people and organizations who w •
and study, write articles and make speeches, worry and spend
sleepless nights ~ all because of fear of the debt — could
forget about it for a while and spend even half their efforts
trying to find ways of achieving a growing national income
,
their contribution to the benefit and welfare of humanity —
and to the solution of the debt problem —« would be far greater. 4
4
Evsey D. Domar, "The Burden of the Debt and the National Income
Readings in Fiscal Policy, Arthur Smithies and J. Keith Butters, edi* £




THE RECESSION OF 1953-1954
BACKGROUND
The recession of 1953-54 began with a downturn in the Gross National
Product in July 1953. The peak to trough decline of $10 billion is graphi-
cally illustrated in Figure 5. The large cutback in federal government
expenditures associated with the end of the Korean War is believed to have
been the major cause of the recession, Defense expenditures declined
from an annual rate of $53 billion in the 2nd quarter of 1953 to $41., 9
billion in the 3rd quarter of 1954, A substantial decline in defense
orders had begun in 1952 prior to the Eisenhower administration taking
office. These reductions continued through the first six months of 1953
,
and with the signing of the Korean armistice in July, defense expenditures
began an even more rapid decline
.
President Eisenhower, upon assuming office in Tanuary 19 53, inher-
ited a budget prepared by the outgoing Truman administration. That was
the budget for Fiscal Year 1954, which was to start six months later, and
it included increased expenditures of $4 billion and a sizable deficit. The
incoming administration appeared to be much more concerned thai its prede-=
cessors about the prospects of inflation. It is therefore interesting to note
that during the early months of the new Eisenhower administration, the
President was primarily concerned with the possible inflationary tenden-
cies of the Truman budget for Fiscal Year 1954. Accordingly, President
Eisenhower's efforts in those early months were largely directed toward
revising the Truman budget downward, thus decreasing government
Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950's --An Economic






expenditures still further „ His attitude was very much reflected in his
State of the Union message on February 2 3 1953, in which he promised to
reduce planned deficits , balance the budget and check the menace of in-
flation . 2
The eventual result of efforts to reduce the budget was that the mili-
tary programs of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Com-
mision, together with foreign aid, accounted for $5.6 billion of the total
reduction of $6.5 billion below the Truman estimates of budget expendi-
tures . The short-run inflexibility in the federal budget is indicated by the
fact that, in spite of the Administration's intensive efforts to trim expendi-
tures, reductions outside the national defense and foreign aid categories
were only modest.
It is also of considerable importance to an understanding of the reces-=
sion, to point out that when President Eisenhower took office a number of
major tax reductions were provided for by completed legislation. The
wartime excess profits tax was scheduled to expire on June 30, 19 53. Indi-
vidual income tax rates were to drop by ten percent on January 1, 19 54 And
on April 1, 19 54 the corporate tax rate was to be decreased from 52 percent
to 47 percent, and certain temporary increases in excise taxes were to
expire
.
In an increased effort to balance the budget and curb expected infla-
tion, the President requested an extension of the wartime excess profits
taxes scheduled to expire on June 30, 1953. The President wanted
2
Wilfred Lewis, Jr. , Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions
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Illustration of the drop in GNP during 19 53-
19 54 recession. As indicated the downturn began
in mid 1953 and reached bottom point at the end
of that year. There was a total drop of approxi-
mately $10 Bil. A gradual rise began in early 1954
and continued through the 3rd Qtr. A sharp upturn
began in the 4th Qtr of 19 54.
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to extend these taxes through December 31, of that year, and Congress
authorized the extension „ At the same time there was a move in Congress
to effect a ten percent reduction in personal income taxes as of July 1,
19 53, which, as indicated above, was actually scheduled for Tanuary 1,
1954. The President objected to this change in plans and was success-
ful in maintaining the original schedule. On June 1, 1953, Secretary of
the Treasury Humphrey defended the Administration's recommendations
for extension of the excess profits tax and no acceleration of the sched-
uled reductions of individual income taxes on the grounds that "further
inflation must be stopped and the dollar must be kept sound to provide
3
a solid base for a healthy economy."
FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY
Apparently President Eisenhower and his advisors were not the only
ones concerned about inflation. In January of 1953, the Federal Reserve
Board, seeing a possible inflationary threat, raised the discount rate from
1-3/4 to 2 percent and sold government securities on the open market, in
order to put pressure on member bank reserves. The Board's concern was
largely the result of three years of steady growth of the money supply, a
sharp increase in business loans from banks in the closing months of 1952,
an upward drift in wholesale prices of industrial goods , and a price climb
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the Fed decided to pursue a policy of watchful waiting, not wishing to
create too stringent conditions surrounding the availability of credit
.
This policy of caution, however , was disturbed when the Treasury-
announced in April, and threw onto the market for sale in May $1.2
billion of long-term 3-1/4 percent bonds. The issue represented an
avowed Treasury policy of lengthening debt maturities and embracing
a higher interest rate structure . The 3-1/4 percent was carrying out the
latter with inordinate determination since the yield on long-term govern-
or
ment securities had reached only 2„87 percent in early March, 19 53.
The resulting further upward pressure on interest rates apparently seemed
to the Federal Reserve authorities to create the possibility of an overly
stringent credit policy in view of economic conditions and certain eco-
nomic indicators by the second quarter of the year, (See Table I and
Figure 6) . The Board accordingly reversed itself, and entered the open
7
market to make purchases in May and June, thus easing credit . This
timely action by the Board to ease credit proved to be of considerable
benefit to the outcome of the recession, particularly since it encouraged
a sharp rise in residential construction
.
Kenneth D. Roosa, "Business Fluctuations in the United States
Since 1951, " American Economic Review , May, 1955, pp» 384-387.
Ralph E. Freeman, "Postwar Monetary Policy, " Postwar Economic
Trends in the United States (New York: Harper, 19 60) , p. 70 „
7









































































































LO •-> Tt cr a CO
CO ^r c CN c_ CM


























LO X LO a ^r
LO











































































































































•M +jX c CO o
C o (D Cn






































































^ CD O co





















































































































O •rH a c








By September 1953 the Administration began to show signs of con-
cern about the economic outlook, By that time there was unquestionable
evidence of the impending recession. The evidence included the down-
turn in certain key economic indicators — among them Weekly Manu-
facturing Hours , the Freight Car Loadings Index and Steel Ingot Produc-
tion. Even more convincing was an upturn in the unemployment rate., And,
of course, by this time the GNP had already begun to decrease. The
President's reaction to these unfavorable indications as stated at his
September cabinet meeting was that the Republican Party must be ready
to use the full power of the government if necessary to prevent "another
1929 "
In September task forces at the staff level were established under the
auspices of the Council of Economic Advisors to examine the economic
aspects of a number of governmental programs. These included house
modernization and repair, federal credit aids to construction, public works,
unemployment compensation, tax revision, community and business pro-
grams to expand employment and programs to strengthen the financial
system
. The thinking of the Council of Economic Advisors at that time
was less in terms of increased government spending and more in terms of
monetary policy, the activities of private business, tax reduction and
government programs emphasizing loans rather than construction undertaken
o
by the government itself.
By January 1954, recognition that the economy was in recession was
widespread. Retail sales were sluggish, and the unemployment rate con-
tinued to rise. In addition to the usual trio of messages to Congress , at
o
Lewis, op_. cit.
, p. 145 .
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that time of year, there were an unusually large number of special mes-
sages covering such programs as housing, agriculture and social secu-
rity o A review of antirecessionary policy actions already taken was pre-
sented in the President's Economic Report. The major ones were:
(1) Federal Reserve action to ease credit during the previous
May. This action -- while actually started before the turning
point -- was most fortunate, and the ease with which it was
done lends support to the view that monetary policy can be
used with more flexibility than fiscal policy. Early action on
the monetary front proved to be of considerable benefit, parti-
cularly in that it contributed to a highly desirable spurt in resi-
dential construction o
(2) Tax reductions o As previously planned the wartime excess
profits taxes expired in January, and the ten percent reduction
in personal income taxes became effective.
(3) Price supports and other aids extended the farmers „ The
stepped-up outlays for farm price supports, however, had off-
setting effects in reducing the real income of consumers „ The
outlays were in response to changes in supply, rather than
demand, and were largely automatic under the law. The
administration's attitude toward such outlays is reflected in
the fact that its proposals at that time featured flexible
price supports , a euphemism for hoped-for reductions in govern-
ment outlays
.
(4) Steps to improve and coordinate public works planning.
This policy should actually be classified as a long-range
35

reform, or a hedge against more serious depression, since 19 53-54
came and went without an effort by the administration to use such
9
plans for economic stabilization
.
The Economic Report also listed a number of antirecessionary-
weapons available in case of need. They included; federal reserve credit
controls; debt management techniques of the Treasury; presidential author-
I l
ity to alter terms of FHA-insured mortgages; the flexible administration of
budget expenditures; taxation; public works; and newly recommended agri-
cultural price supports
.
The administration's attitude during the early months of 1954 was
one of preparedness and watchful waiting. They felt that the situation did
not call for drastic action, but they were ready to move if and when it did u
During this period, the goal of balancing the budget received muted em-
phasis. With the fate of the economy in the balance it was submerged under
the determination of the administration to undertake those actions neces-
sary to prevent a serious recession at any cost.
EXPENDITURE POLICY REVISED
By April the President had become increasingly concerned about the
economic situation. The President's concern was partially the result of
a continued rise in the unemployment rate, even though in March there
were other indicators that had begun to show favorable signs . The list










directed a speed-up of government expenditures budgeted for fiscal year
1955. In response to the President's remarks and instructions at the May
14 cabinet meeting, it was decided that the budgeting policy of the admin-
istration would be to increase expenditures on useful projects as rapidly
as possible, wherever this could be done within the overall limits of
expenditure totals already planned for fiscal 1955 . From this it appears
that the general plan was rather cautious in nature. Also items requiring
legislation or supplemental appropriations were ruled out. And it was de-
cided that the expenditure policy would be reversed in six months in order
to leave fiscal 1955 total budgeted expenditures unchanged. Furthermore,
in relation to the total budget, the amount involved in the expenditure
speed-up was small, being roughly $1 billion. It is likely, in fact, that
the estimated $2.2 5 billion increase in obligations corresponding to the
increase in expenditures was actually psychologically more beneficial than
the expenditures themselves. About 75 percent of the increase in expendi-
tures and 85 percent of the increase in obligations were for Department of
Defense military programs. DOD steps which were expected to have an
expansionary impact included: requesting contractors to step up production
and delivery rates; placing orders for the 1955 shipbuilding program earlier
than planned; speeding up the award of contracts; and purchasing supplies
for industrial and stock funds earlier than usual. Other departments and
agencies involved in the speedup were Commerce, Interior, Agriculture,








By July certain economic indicators began, to turn upward .(See
Table I and Fig. 6) . There was an indication that the trough in GNP had
passed, although unemployment did not reach its maximum rate of a little
over six percent until a quarter later. Over the next year the GNP in-
creased by $34 billion, and by May 1955 unemployment declined to a rate
of slightly over four percent . Expansion after mid 1954 was aided by a
strong rise in residential construction which had started in the second
quarter and a strong rise in consumption starting in the fourth , The latter,
sparked by a sharp increase in the purchase of automobiles, continued to
climb upward in mid 19 55 having risen from a pre~recession peak of approxi-
mately $2 32 billion in July 19 53 to approximately $252 billion in June 19 55*
The decline in federal spending was less steep after the middle of 19 54,
and expenditures remained fairly constant from the fourth quarter of 1954
through the third quarter of 1955. And liquidation of business inventories
ceased in the final quarter of 19 54, and was changed to accumulation
12
starting in the first quarter of 19 55. The effects of the rise in con-
sumption, the cessation of the decrease in government spending, and the
upturn in investment combined to carry the economy out of the recession.
GNP COMPONENT BEHAVIOR
Consumption
In reviewing the 19 53-54 recession in terms of the behavior of the
various components of GNP, probably of greatest significance was the
buoyancy of disposable income and, in turn, consumption. Subsequent
to the peak in GNP in July 19 53, and as the downturn confined into the








decreased disposable income . The automatic stabilizers were primarily
in the form of reduced tax receipts, increased transfer payments, and re-
duced savings . (See Table III) , Partially as a result of this, consumption
expenditures were not seriously affected by the recession (See Figure 7
and Tables II and III) . With the exception of a slight drop in late 19 53,
consumption continued to increase throughout the recession , In addition
to the desirable effect of the built-in stabilizers, the lapsing of wartime
excess profits taxes and the reduction in personal income taxes in January
19 54, both contributed to the maintenance of stable consumption. Another
important influence on consumption during this period was the deferred
consumer demand that had accumulated during the Korean War.
The performance of disposable income and consumption constituted
the primary explanation of the recession's mildness and, together with
housebuilding, the ensuing recovery, The sustained rise in consumption
acted as a moderating influence on the recession and as a base for re-
covery. Table III shows the magnitude of the increase in consumption
along with the immediate explanations for it. The rise in consumption of
$5.4 billion demonstrates the autonomy from GNP that characterized con-
sumption during the recession.
13
Vatter, _op. cit,




Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Spending Categories
1950-1955
(in billions of 1954 dollars)
Personal Consumption 216.8 218.5 224.2 235,1 238.0 256.0
Durables 32.1 29.2 28.5 33,1 32.4 39.6
Nondurables 109.2 111.2 115.0 118.3 119.3 125,4
Services 75.5 78.2 80.0 83.7 86.3 9K0
14




Personal Income, Consumption and Savings, 1953-54 Recession 15
(amounts in seasonally adjusted annual rates in billions of dollars)
Pre-recession
peak trough
(April, May, (July, Aug. , Change
June, 1953) Sept., 1954) Amount Percent
Wage and salary disbursements 198.8 195.4 -3.4 - 1.7
Private 164.8 160.8 -4.0 - 2.4
Government 34.0 34.6 + 0.6 + 1.8
Transfer payments 14.1 16.5 + 2.4 + 17,0
Proprietor's Income 40.7 40.9 + 0.2 + 0.5
Business and professional 27.5 27.8 + 0.3 + 1.1
Farm 13.2 13.1 -0.1 - 0.8
Property income 33.2 35.3 + 2.1 + 6.3
Rents 10.5 10.9 + 0.4 + 3.8
Dividends 9.4 9.7 + 0.3 + 3.2
Interest 13.7 14.7 + 1.4 + 10.5
Other income 1.9 1.6 -0.3 -15.8
Total personal income 288.7 289.7 + 1.0 + 0.3
Less: Personal tax and non-
tax payments 35.9 32.9 -3.0 - 8.4
Equals: Disposal income 252.8 256.8 +4.0 + 1.6
Less: Personal consumption
expenditures 233.3 238.7 + 5.4 + 2.3
Equals; Personal saving 19.6 18,0 -1.6 - 8.2
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monthly Review (St. Louis;
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With the exception of a slight drop in late 1953, con-
sumption continued to increase during the recession
. This
was largely due to: (1) deferred demand accumulated during
the Korean War and (2) relaxation of wartime tax rates in
early 1954.
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the drop in GNP. This was primarily due to the reduction
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Investment decreased and contributed to the drop
in GNP. This decline in investment was primarily the





Although consumption declined only slightly at one point , and in
fact continued to rise throughout most of the recession, the rate of rise
was somewhat sluggish. Retail sales in particular barely rose subse-
quent to the third quarter of 19 52. As a result the reverse "acceleration
effect" was set in motion, and this induced an absolute decline in in-
vestment following the appearance of unexpected inventory accumulations
.
The decline in investment, therefore, was largely in the nature of an
inventory disinvestment on the part of businessmen. The magnitude of
the decline, which was from an annual rate of about $53 billion in June
19 53 to about $44.5 billion in December of that year, is illustrated in
Figure 9 . The size of the inventory disinvestment is shown in Figure 10
.
As can be seen from the graphs the upturn in investment came in late 19 54
as the rate of consumption spending began to increase more rapidly and
as businessmen began placing orders again
.
The long-term share of business investment, though slightly sensi-
tive to the recession, rode it out with only a moderate decline . Expendi-
tures for new plant and equipment fell from a peak of $28 „ 8 billion in the
third quarter of 19 53 to a trough of $25.7 billion in the first quarter of 19 55.
The decline was widely diffused, the commercial and public utilities
sector being among the least affected. The moderateness of the decline
in long-term investment has been attributed to a combination of the mild-
ness and brevity of the recession drop in total spending, the stickiness
of prices during the period, the favorable sales prospects that emerged
from the strong performance of total consumption and housing, and the
strength of the corporate financial position. Business investment was
also much encouraged by satisfactory profits and cash flow The expira-












Figure 10 illustrates the inventory dis-
investment by businessmen during 1953-1954
recession.












Net foreign investment rose from
a minus $2.1 billion in the first
quarter of 1954 to a minus $0.7
billion in the second quarter of
1955.
* Billions of dollars
Source:
Business Statistics




of the fall in corporate profits in 1954 by a decrease in corporate tax
liabilities also contributed to the moderateness of the decline in long=
term investment. The tax decrease completely absorbed the decline in
corporate profits before taxes between 1953 and 1954. And aggregate
corporate profits after taxes in both years were higher than in 1952 . The
institutional features of the economic environment therefore acted not
only to bolster disposable income, but also to cushion the effect of con-
traction on business profits.
Net Foreign Investment
Also worthy of mention is the boost in net foreign investment which
occurred during the period of the 1953-54 recession. The rise was due
primarily to a slight rise in exports combined with a decline in imports.
Reversal about mid 1953 of an export decline that had persisted since
early 1951 has been attributed for the most part to the industrial expansion
17
of Western Europe and the United Kingdon in 19 53 and 1954 „ The rise in
net foreign investment during this period is illustrated in Table IV.
Government Spending
Being the major cause of the recession, the decrease in government
spending associated with the end of the Korean War has been extensively
discussed in previous sections of this chapter. The decline in government
spending was from an annual rate of approximately $85 billion in June of
1953 to approximately $75 billion in December of 1954. This decrease is
illustrated graphically in Figure 8.
In addition to the decrease in defense expenditures after the war,
it has been pointed out that the Eisenhower administration attempted
16
Vatter, op_. cit.






to decrease federal expenditures still further during the early part of the
recession. The President's program at that time suggests a conflict
between stabilization and budget goals.
Despite the plans in May 1954 to speed-up expenditures by $1 billion
of fiscal 1955 funds, it appears that the actual increases were much less
than planned. Lewis has compiled a tabulation of the estimated effects of
the defense portion of the speed-up. This data is presented in Table V.
TABLE V
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF ANTIRECESSION DEFENSE SPEED-UP
ON OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1955 18










Fiscal Year Total — 0,4
The rescheduling of expenditures did not actually take effect until the
second quarter of the fiscal year and then only amounted to $0„ 1 billion
.
There was a further increase of $0.4 billion in the third quarter, but this




, op_. cit. , p . 17 9 .
46

tions , however, appear to have been successful with a $(L5 billion in
crease in the first quarter of the fiscal year and an additional $2 o billion
in the second quarter.
CONCLUSION
The 1953-1954 recession was the mildest of the three recessions that
occurred during the decade of the 50°s „ There was a $10 billion, 2,7%
drop in GNP compared with $9.5 billion, 3,6% in 1948-50 and $15,4
billion, 3.4% in 1957-58=, The decline in government expenditures as-
sociated with the end of the Korean War was the major cause of the re-
cession. A secondary cause was the decrease in investment which was
largely in the nature of an inventory disinvestment on the part of business-
men. The buoyant performance of disposable income, and in turn consump-
tion, contributed to the mildness of the recession, and together with house-
building, the ensuing recovery.
Considering the magnitude of the decrease in defense expenditures
facing the government, it appears that the authorities were fairly effec-
tive in combating the recession. The Federal Reserve Board's application
of discretionary monetary policy by casing credit through the purchase of
government securities and later by reducing the rediscount rate, stimulated
the residential building program and eventually encouraged investment on
the part of businessmen.
From the vantage point of hindsight, perhaps the major error committ-
ed was in not allowing the excess profits tax and individual income tax
cutstotake place on July 1, 1953, rather than six months later. This was
the date already scheduled for expiration of the excess profits tax and the
date strongV pushed for individual income tax cuts by key Congressional
leaders. There was strong evidence of the impending recession by sever-
al key economic indicators, in particular Weekly Manufacturing Hours and
47

Steel Ingot Production, both of which turned donward in the second
quarter of 1953. The decline in defense spending turned out to be
much greater than originally anticipated, and as late as January 1954
was still seriously underestimated. Nevertheless, a cutback in de-
fense spending, even of the smaller size contemplated earlie
,
pro-
bably could not have been digested by the economy ~ in the ab-
sense of tax cuts — without a setback. The failure to schedule tax
cuts earlier was caused by; lingering concern about inflationary
tendencies, uncertainty about the response of the economy to removal
of direct controls carried over from the Korean War, and the indepen
19dent importance attached to balanced budgets, per se„ In defense
of the administration, however, it is pointed out that unemployment re-
mained at an unusually low rate of 2 „ 7 percent up until September 1 955
Therefore ,concern over potential inflation up until that time was not
completely unreasonable.
Discretionary counterrecession expenditure actions were slow to be
initiated and were modest in scope — being limited for the most part to
within-year shifts of government expenditures. A general speed-up of
expenditures was finally initiated in May 1954 after certain economic
indicators had begun to show a favorable tendency . The circumstances
surrounding the speed-up , to be reversed after six months, suggest that
the administration was fairly confident that a turning point in the economy
was imminent, and that the purpose of the speed-up was to hasten, or
strengthen the recovery rather than to initiate an otherwise doubtful turn-
ing point.
That there may have been some conflict between budgetary and stab-
lization goals in borne out by the fact that the actual federal surplus reach-
ed a rate of $3.5 billion in the second quarter of 1955, compared with a






from a $7 billion deficit to a $3,5 billion surplus occurred while unemploy-
ment rose from a rate of 2 . 6 percent before the recession to upwards of 6
percent in the middle of the recession, finally leveling off at about 4 per-
centinmidl 9S5. 20
By the end of 1954 some indications of the 1955-1956 boom period were
beginning to become apparent. It appears, therefore, that in the recovery
from the recession of 1953-1954, a potentially too-tight fiscal policy
was redeemed by the emergence of inflationary pressures from unexpected
quarters. In short, had the inflationary period beginning in 195 5 not been
forthcoming, the government may have been forced to pursue a policy call-








THE RECESSION OF 1957-1958
The 1957-58 recession has frequently been described as a "class-
ical" or "text-book" example of business contraction „ This is due pri-
marily to the fact that it was the first postwar period recession which
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role played by business fixed investment It is also unique in that its
sharp decline caused a Republican Administration and a Democratic
Congress to attempt to outdo each other in adding to the expenditure
side of the Federal budget.
CAUSES OF THE RECESSION
The seeds of the 1957-58 recession were sown in the great con-
sumer spending boom of 19 55. This unusual jump in consumer spend-
ing was revealed in a study made by Professor Daniel Suits, director
of the University of Michigan's Research Seminar in Quantitative
Economics. In terms of past relations between consumer spending and
income, taxes, liquid assets, and population, Suits calculated that
consumption should have risen some $ll-billion in 1955. However, it
jumped $18-billion. The biggest factor behind this extra $7-billion jump
in buying was an increase in consumer debt, which rose $5.8-billion in
19 55 compared with an $0.5-billion rise in 19 54. This jump was high-
lighted by a housing boom, as consumers added $12 . 5-billion to their
mortgage debt, and needless to say, Detroit had a banner year.
Business firms began to lay in heavier inventories and as production
began to move toward capacity, industry boosted new orders for capital
goods . The resultant flow of money for new plants and equipment shot
up and the boom was on. This trend continued on into 1957, but between
the end of 1955 and mid 1957 something went wrong . The economic thorn
turned out to be the fact that the consumer couldn't keep up with the
tremendous pace being set by the producer.
While business capital spending stimulated by the 19 55 spending
rush plunged upward, consumer borrowing, spending and income stopped




its abnormal surge and returned to a normal or slightly below normal pare
Thus a profit squeeze was generated as the economy had generated ca-
pacity faster than demands
The Federal Reserve Board, in an attempt to head off an inflationary
trend, tightened up the money market, which, although it had virtually
no effect on capital spending, did hurt housing . The tight money made
the fixed-rate government insured mortgages far less attractive to in-
vestors than other higher yield investments „ This fall off in housing
construction had the expected effect on other consumer durables Thus
the gap between rising capacity and a more slowly rising consumption
was widened. This action coupled by a severe cutback in defense
spending in the second half of 1957 proved to be the cause of this re-
2
cession,,
VIEW FROM THE WHITE HOUSE
Steering the nation through the varying courses and currents of
economic change is no small task and President Eisenhower realizing
this early in his first term, had relied on the sound advice offered him
by his advisors in successfully combating the recession of 1953 54,
However, two of the key men of his economic brain trust, George
Humphrey and Arthur Burns had been replaced by Robert Anderson and
Raymond Saulnier by 19 57 as Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisors, respectivelyo The task of recog-









Saulnier was the first to apprise the president of the fact that the
economy seemed to be slowing down and that there was an absence of
latent strength powerful enough to push it anew onto substantially-
higher ground. He felt the "kick" was going out of the inflationary-
push and that an easing in the Federal Reserve Board's tight credit
policy was called for. This view was proffered in the early summer of
1957
Saulnier based his opinion on several leading trend indicators.
Among which were: (1) average hours worked in basic manufacturing,
(2) new orders for durable good, (3) stock market prices, (4) spot




His view was a minority opinion at the time, as the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, W. Mo Martin, as well as the Treasury
Secretary, felt the immediate danger to the economy was inflation
„
By July, Saulnier had lost all hope of a new upsurge, but he felt
that a timely easing in the Fed's credit policy would right the economy
before a really serious disturbance occurred, Mr, Martin still disagreed
and felt his tight money policy was still the correct one to pursue, and
in tact even raised the discount rate further in August, Saulnier voiced
his disapproval to no avail
.
About this time the 19 59 budget was in preparation and it was con-
structed on the assumption that federal expenditures could be shrunk to
3
Raymond Saulnier, (Ph .D. Economics, Columbia) a former college
professor at Barnard, had been an advisor to the Department of Agri-
culture during the Truman administration, He had served as a consultant
to, and as a member of the Council of Economic Advisors prior to becom-
ming its chairman.
4
Charles J V. Murphy, "The White House and the Recession,"
Fortune
.
May 1958, p. 108.
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to $68-billion and that revenues could reach as much as $7 6 „ 6-=billion,
with full employment. A surplus of that sort would seem to justify a
large tax cut, and Saulnier felt that this would bolster purchasing power
and provide fresh incentives for investment. This hope went into orbit
with Sputnik I.
In October, with the advent of the Russian satellite, Congress,
the press and many powerful public figures joined together in demanding
a mighty step-up in military spending. At the same time, the economic
indicators turned down, and Saulnier became certain that a recession
had begun. Saulnier expressed his views in a meeting of what was known
as the "Little Four"; Secretary Anderson , Chairman Martin, presidential
advisor Gabriel Hauge, Saulnier and the President . Again Saulnier was
expressing a minority view. The others still felt that inflation was the
big problem. Mr. Martin, in addition, felt that open-market operations,
being initiated by the Fed, would cure any dip in business activity.
In the second meeting of this group in November, Saulnier introduced
new data that had been worked up, on then relatively new electronic com-
puters , by Julius Shiskin, the chief economic statistician of the Census
Bureau. This data proved convincing and two days later the FED reduced
the discount rate from 3-1/2 to 3 percent. Through the unceasing efforts
of Mr, Saulnier the budget presented to Congress in January 19 59 was
changed to reflect prudent fiscal policy and totalled $73 „ 9 -billion, thus
showing an apparent surplus of some $500-million, a far cry from the











By January, the President's public statements implied that there
was no immediate need for action to fight recession, even though he
was well aware that the recession had arrived „ He continued to blame
politics for recession talk. He reaffirmed Mr. Martin's views at a
news conference on the 15th when he described monetary policy as the
powerful tool that would stimulate the economy, Democratic and Republi-
can party leaders continued to debate whether or not the recession was
at hand, and the January unemployment figures seemed to be the clinch-
ing piece of evident that convinced both groups that the recession was
here. On March 8, 19 58, the President, in letters to the minority leaders
7
of Congress took his first active steps in combating the recession
.
These letters described his view of the government's role in the
growth and vigor of the economy. He felt that the government should
stimulate private production and employment and that public spending
should not replace private spending . He listed the following steps that
were being taken by the administration-.
1. An acceleration of civil public works projects
.
2. The release of $200-million from the President's discretionary
fund for FNMA special assistant mortgage purchases.
3. The award of more defense contracts to labor surplus areas „
4. An increase in the discount allowance on VA^guaranteed
mortgages
.
5. A liberalization of lending rules by Federal Home Loan Banks
His proposals for congressional action were°
1. Supplementary appropriations for the coming fiscal year in order




Jr. , Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions
(Washington: The Brookings Institute, 19 62)




2 „ A three-year suspension of expenditure limitations in the
Highway Act to permit apportionment of an additional
$2. 2 -billion of federal funds to the states over a three
year period.




The President described the steps that the administration was
taking as projects that were useful and needed in themselves, and as
ones that would start quickly, provide employment quickly and not drag
out so long as to compete with the needs of private enterprise when re-
covery came. The President's emphasis on speed and reversibility indi-
cated his preference for his particular proposals over others now being
discussed in Congress. On 19 March 1958 he initiated five more steps
to speed up expenditures . They were:
1. Reserves were being released on $100 million in balances
of authorizations for the public facility loan program, and the HHFA was
to broaden loan eligibility and take steps to accelerate the starting of new
projects
.
2 . Starts on college housing were to be expedited where plan-
ning was completed or substantially completed, again liberalizing loan
eligibility where necessary.
3. Urban renewal projects were to be expedited, broadening the
types of construction eligible for authorized financing where necessary „
4. In cooperation with local authorities, steps were to betaken








5. The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) was to encourage
faster construction by REA borrowers and loans to REA consumers for
9
purchase of electrical equipment,,
Additional administrative actions were announced the next day.
The Secretary of Agriculture said loan criteria were being liberalized,
and loans encouraged by the Farmers Home Administration and by the
Commodity Credit Corporation. An earlier than usual announcement of
fiscal 19 59 allocations to states for airport construction was made, and
the Small Business Administration got in the act by reducing its under=
writing fee on deferred participation loans „
The possibility of a tax cut had been a much discussed proposal in
public forums and the President revealed the following at his March 26
news conference. He said that tax cuts were a possibility, but that
this was a serious step and not one that he was going to be stampeded
into. He revealed that Mr. Anderson had reached an agreement with
democratic congressional leaders that nothing would be done on taxes
before bipartisan consultation. This "gentleman's agreement" was pri-
marily a move to head off a threatening race between the two parties as
10
to who would be able to claim credit in an election year.
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
The steps taken by the administration to combat the recession were-
1. Speed-up in construction rates on direct federal public works
already under way -- primarily water resource projects.
2„ Encouragment of faster private, state and local government







federal loans, public housing, airports, hospitals, and construction
supported by loans to REA cooperatives . In some of these cases, funds
that had been held in reserve were released or apportioned to the agen-
cies for spending earlier than they might have been in the normal course
of events. In other cases, the action consisted of exhortation only.
3 , Speed-up within fiscal 1958 of agency procurement of sup-
plies, materials and equipment,,
4. Speed-up early in calendar 1958 of processing and payment
of tax refunds
.
5. Liberalization of FHA and VA housing credit rules and speed-
up in processing FHA loan applications.
6. Release of budgetary reserves in various FNMA special
assistance mortgage purchase programs.
7. Liberalization of eligibility rules for Farmers Home Admin-
istration loans
.
8. Emphasis on labor surplus areas in procurement contracts
placed by the Department of Defense and the General Services Adminis-
tration
.
The administrative speed-up of public works projects appears to
have added some $50 -million to $100 -million in fiscal 1958 and about
$175-million in fiscal 1959. As shown in table VI the refunds of indi-
vidual income tax were much more successfully speeded up in 19 58
than they had been in the 19 54 recession. The table shows that refunds
in March and April 1958 were about $600-million higher. The welfare








REFUNDS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX, RECESSION YEARS
COMPARED TO PRECEDING YEARS
(Cumulative percentage of total paid by end of month and


















October. . . . 95.9
November = . . 97.8





































for those whose refunds stem from unemployment during the previous
year.
The 1958 housing boom featured a rise of 40 percent in residential
construction between the second quarter of 1958 and the second quarter
of 19 59 , and was one of the strong factors in the recovery . Administra-
tion actions releasing housing reserves and affecting mortgage terms
probably played some part in this expansion of private construction . How-
ever, administration actions on housing terms were probably less signi-
ficant than the April 1 down-payment liberalization on FHA loans, which
required legislation. The real cause of the boom was probably due to in-





Of much more significance in 19 58 were the anti-recessionary actions
of the congress. There were four items among the many legislations
passed that were clearly anti-recessionary. They were:
1„ Temporary extended unemployment compensation (P.L. 85-441,
June 4, 19 58) provided federal funds with which states could pay benefits
to unemployed individuals who exhausted their benefit rights for half again
as long as they were able to collect under the regular state unemployment
compensation systems
.
2. The legislation on advance procurement (P.L. 85-386, April 24,
1958) authorized agencies other than the Department of Defense to order
(or buy) in 19 58, if possible, up to 50 percent of amounts proposed in
the January budget for 1959 supplies, materials, and equipment to be






3. The Highway Act of 1958 (P.L* 8 5-381, April 16) increased:
(a) 1959 authorizations for interstate, ABC (primary, secondary, and
urban) , and forest and public lands highways; (b) 19 60 and 1961 author-
izations for interstate highways; and (c) 1961 authorizations for forest
and public lands highways . In addition , it provided for an advance to
1959 of ABC authorizations to be repaid from 19 61 and 1962 authorizations
.
To make apportionments to the states against these various authoriza-
tions possible, it waived, with respect to apportionment of the 1959 and
1960 authorizations, the pay-as-you-go requirement of the basic highway
legislation „
4, The Housing Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-364, April 1) authorized, among
other things , a reduction in minimum down payments on FHA-insured
mortgages; $1 billion for special assistance purchase by FNMA of mort-
gages on new homes costing $13,500 or less; and an increase in the
interest rate limit on VA-guaranteed loans,, Other provisions, such as
renewal of VA's expiring direct loan program, may also have had some
14
counter-recession aspects, but would probably have occurred anway.
The fiscal impact of these measures is estimated in table VII „
The temporary extension of unemployment compensation undoubtedly
had a prompt and stable economic impact during the recovery- Although
transfer payments in general probably have a smaller total impact on
aggregate demand per dollar of outlay than government purchases on goods
and services, the extended unemployment compensation was probably
relatively efficient in this respect since it went to individuals with pre-







ESTIMATED IMPACT OF MAJOR 1958 ANTIRECESSION
LEGISLATION ON BUDGET OR TRUST FUND
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal Year Increase in Expenditures
Legislation
1961
1958 1959 1960 and later
Temporary extended unemploy-
ment compensation 48 447 -13 -482
Advance procurement, 1959
supplies and equipment -6
Federal aid to highways:
ABC (primary, secondary
and urban)

























, p. 226 .
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The effect of advance procurement in fiscal 1958 of 1959 supplies
and equipment for nondefense agencies had little success,, Reasons for
the failure in this area included lack of storage space, insufficient time,
long term commitments and the apparent facts that established agency
practices and procedures are extremely resistant to change and that
procurement items of significant magnitude are apt to require a long lead
time.
The federal aid to highways was quite successful and construction
approved by the Bureau of Public Roads in December 1958 was about
95 percent completed by the target date of December 1, 19 59„
The FNMA program of special assistance purchase of mortgages on
newly constructed low-cost houses appears to have been a relatively
inefficient anti-recession device, in that construction was increased by
substantially less than federal outlays. While the entire $l=billion in
special assistance funds was committed by the end of calendar 1958,
builders stockpiled commitments received from FNMA, and a substantial
portion remained unused until 1959 building season. More important, the
initial injection of funds came at a time when mortgage money was plenti-
ful, and the competition for available mortgages active „ The state of the
mortgage market was indicated by the large volume of mortgages FNMA
was able to sell under its secondary market operations which were





The FED first recognized the trend shift from inflation to recession
in November of 1958. Its first actions were to direct its open market







also reduced the discount rates on member bank borrowings at this time
As the stream of factual information continued to verify the presence of
the recession, the FED's actions and policies became more aggressive
and discount rate, open market and reserve requirement instruments were
actively applied in complementary fashion to foster ease in credit markets
and encourage bank credit and monetary expansion.
From November 19 57 until April 1958, there were four reductions in
Federal Reserve discount rates, from 3-1/2 percent to 1-3/4 percent At
the same time the Reserve System supplied commercial banks with some
$2-billion of reserve funds through open market operations „ In addition,
the System, through three successive reserve requirement reductions,
released for the use of member banks about $1.5-billion of their required
reserves. The total amount of reserve funds supplied by the System to
commercial banks during this period, actually from November 1957 to
July 1958, was enough to enable member banks to reduce their discounts
at Reserve Banks from $800 -million to about $100 -million, to offset
sales of gold to foreign countries amounting to $1. 5-billion, and to fin-
ance a commercial bank credit expansion of almost $8 -billion Finally,




William McChesney Martin, Jr„ , "A Year of Recession and Re-
covery" Federal Reserve Bulletin^ 45 s2
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A quick glance at Table VIII shows what happened to the various
components of the GNP, from peak to trough.




Private Investment -12.1 =20.6
Government Purchases +2.2 2.9






DECLINE OF SPENDING TRENDS
Source: Survey of Current Business
It is clearly shown here that the recession was registered for the
most part as a private investment slump, and as had been the case in
1953, inventory disinvestment accounted for the bulk of the loss in
investment, followed by producer's durable equipment. Note the small
change of the consumption component , which indicates the extreme
stability of consumer spending for non-durables and services.
The persistance of inflation after the onset of decline, and the
uncertainty in the immediate post-Sputnik period about what levels of
defense and space research might be required in the future, were major
factors in the administration's delay in acknowledging the recession and
proposing corrective actions.
Once the fact that the recession was here was acknowledged, the
administration still held onto the idea that no anti-cyclical action by
65

the government would be necessary as it felt that the inherent strength
of the economy would stem the decline. This view soon proved untena
ble and government intercession was started* The administration excluded
the Department of Defense activities from its speed up policies and thus
these activities proved to be ineffective due to their meagemess„ The
facts that 1958 was an election year, that congress was controlled by
"LBJ" and "Mr, Sam" and that the administration really had no plan of
attack all combined to take the initiative for counter-recession acti-
vity from the Executive
The estimated fiscal effects of the 19 58 discretionary anti-reces-
sion actions, along with other factors affecting the federal budget during
the period in question are shown in table IX.
Note in table IX that the swing from surplus to deficit in the federal
fiscal budget over the period of contraction was almost wholly the work
of the built-in fiscal stabilizers . Also note that discretionary anti-
recession actions weren't even in effect by the trough quarter, and that
they made their peak contribution in the last quarter of 19 58 „ More im-
portant during the recovery than these actions were those taken for other
reasons. The effect of such actions as increased expenditures for post-
Sputnik defense actions, farm price supports and the reduction in trans-
portation excises more than outweighed the increase in revenues that
would have taken place at continued high-employment. As a result, the
implicit federal surplus would have declined during the recovery period,
even in the absence of discretionary anti recession spending. Taking all
factors into consideration, the implicit surplus declined by $2 3- billion
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• - Turning now to the FED's actions, we find that although the im~
mediate impact of Federal Reserve policy was on commercial banks,
it clearly had broader effects upon the economy genera liy. For one
thing, since commercial banks are direct participants in some de-
gree in all important credit markets, expansion in bank lending and
investing activities intensified competition among all lenders for
the acquisition of the available supply of creditworthy loans and
securities. This worked to reduce the cost of financing to borrow-
ers generally. It also widened access of ail potential borrowers to
credit funds. This easy money market no doubt was the prime fact-
or that cushioned downward pressures on investment spending, and
helped many companies to minimize cutbacks in their working force,
20
to maintain dividends and to strengthen liquid positions.
Although the recovery in 1958 was not up to the high degree ac=
complished in 1955, it appears that this was due to the early revers-
al of the FED's easy money policies. The FED seems to be more in-
terested in counteracting economic trends rather than sustaining real
economic growth. Indeed, the FED appears to have its eye forever
on the dangers of inflation.
The 1958 recession demonstrated greater political flexibility on
the expenditure side than on the tax side of the budget. This is in-
herent in the fact that expenditure programs can be modified one at a
time in a more gradual fashion, and defended on other than stabiliza-
tion grounds. Such flexibility is a great advantage to the policy of-
ficial, since recognition of recession — first whether there is one,
later how severe and chances of self-correction—proceeds slowly at
best. The administration felt that a tax cut would have been a public
20
Martin, op. cit. , pp. 111-112

1admission of a serious recession, and they believed that when weigh-
ed against expenditure increases, there was really no other choice than
to rule against a tax cut.
Finally the 1958 recession was highlighted both by its sharpness
of contraction and its rapid rebound. The recovery certainly would
have been much slower without the prompt and aggressive actions of
the administration, the congress and last but by no means least the
Federal Reserve System. This recession, one of the shortest in our








In the previous chapters the character and uses of fiscal and
monetary policy and the related federal budget have been analyzed.
Also, we have examined in detail two of the post World War II reces-
sions o We have seen that when private investment and consumption
spending are producing a deflationary gap it is the task of the federal
government, through the application of fiscal and monetary policy, to
offset the gap.
The principal monetary weapons are open market operations, dis-
count rate policy, and changing the legal reserve requirements of the
member banks The principal fiscal weapons to offset recessionary
tendencies are tax-cuts and increases in government expenditure
. Tax-
rate changes have, in recent times, received more emphasis than in
the past. This is in contrast with the great emphasis placed on emer-
gency public works programs of earlier times, particularly during the
Great Depression of the 1930 Q So
The modern economy is bolstered in periods of recession by built-
in stabilizers requiring no discretionary action . Tax rates decrease
automatically as incomesdecrease resulting in lesser decreases in dis-
posable income than in personal income . Unemployment compensation
and other welfare transfers grow automatically during recessionary
periods. The built-in stabilizers serve to oppose the recessionary-
tendency and to wipe out part of the deflationary gap.
Since the automatic stabilizers do not fully offset the instability
of the economy the requirement arises for discretionary action. A
government by laws, not by men, in which fiscal and monetary policies
work automatically untoubhed by human hands, so to speak, is not now
70

anywhere in sight. However, modern innovations to reduce lags in
diagnosis and corrective action are promising . Such innovations
include our vast system for collecting statistical data, advance legis-
lation for tax-cuts, and pre-planned ready to go public works projects.
As the notion that the government's budget had to be balanced
every year was modified, it was first thought that the budget would
be in balance over the business cycle. That is with boom-time sur-
pluses just matching the recession or depression deficits. Today it
is realized that only by coincidence would the number of years of pros-
perity just balance in their intensity the number of years of depression
„
If the economy is in for "secular stagnation" with private savings and
investment actions tending much of the time to produce deflationary gaps
then fiscal policy will probably succeed in maintaining inflationless high
employment only by having a secular increase in the public debt,, If,
on the other hand, the economy is due for "secular exhilaration" with
demand so brisk as to lead much of the time to inflationary gaps , then
fiscal policy will probably be in the form of surplus financing and there
will be a secular downward trend in the public debt„ These are, how-
ever, long-term concepts which would require some dubious predictions
since the actual case will probably lie somewhere between the two ex-
tremes
. At any rate we are generally prepared only to advocate action
2
that the developing situation calls for.
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics --An Introductory ^naTygAf,







In that regard , although we are not currently experiencing a re-
cession, one of the most critical problems facing the United States is
that of increasing the rate of economic growth. Fast as our economy
is running today, all it is doing is standing still. Even though for the
past ten years our economy has not failed to show an annual rise, and
in spite of the fact that in 1963 we added more than $30 billion to our
total output of goods and services to reach a new peak of $585 billion,
the rate of growth has not been sufficient to decrease unemployment.,
At the end of 1963 our jobless rate was around 5 = 1/2 percent, and for
the past six years it has been at 5 percent or more. The unemployment
rate, in other words, is still considerably above the 4 percent ratewhich
is normally considered tolerable. There are over four million Americans
able and willing to work who cannot find jobs today. There were over
four million Americans able and willing to work who could not find jobs
a year ago. Wherever we turn we find the statistical evidence of this
critical economic-social problem facing the United States=-stubbornly
3high unemployment despite a sustained period of prosperity.
Reduction in hours of work has been suggested as a possible solu-
tion to the unemployment problem. In 1961 Dr. Tore Tjersland stated?
In the decade ahead, it is expected that growth
of total factor productivity and gross national pro-
duct at rates comparable to those experienced in the
past will continue. These factors, added to the an-
ticipated rapid increase in number of persons seek-
ing employment will combine to produce a situation
3





which may again call for consideration of reducing
hours of work in order to maintain high levels of
employment opportunities „
That there whould be job opportunities in useful employment for
individuals willing and able to work is one of the many important ob
jectives of our society,, The problem of policy is to achieve the high
employment objective more successfully without sacrificing the achieve-
ment of other goals. Among the other objectives that are closely re=
lated to the achievement of a high rate of economic growth and the
achievement of steady, high employment ares
1. Rapid growth of total output per person which is the source
of rising living standards and the means for achieving other national
goa Is
.
2. Production of those goods and services that the American people
want most.
3. Preservation of economic freedom , which requires limitation
of the scale and character of government economic activities and con-
trols.
4. Avoidance of inflation.
5. Maintenance of the international value of the dollar.
4
Tore Tjersland, "Some Aspects of Employment Problems Facing
the United States in the Period 1960 Through 1970" (Unpublished
Doctoral dissertation , Stanford University, Palo Alto ^ 1961), p. 90,
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Policies selected to promote economic growth and high employ-
ment should not sacrifice these other important objectives,, but on
the contrary should help achieve them, In a free enterprise society
these objectives can be attained only if a high and growing level of
business activity exists. The goal then is the creation by government,
labor and business of a climate and set of conditions which make such
a level possible. In a free enterprise society an understanding and
acceptance of the fact that adequate current and anticipated profits
are fully as important as wages <, salaries and taxes is an essential
element of both climate and conditions . Of critical importance to
this issue is labor's understanding the necessity for profits and busi-
ness growth and governmental willingness to promote a suitable busi-
ness climate through the execution of federal fiscal and monetary poli-
cies
.
The tax cuts approved for 1964 and 1965 are an example of posi-
tive federal fiscal policy to promote economic growth. It can be
shown by assuming a Marginal Propensity to Consume of ,78 (see
Table X), that the $11,5 billion tax cut should produce about a $40 . 8
billion increase in GNP„ This amount is arrived at as follows;
Ay = kb x A T
1





= 3.55 x 11 o 5
= 40o8
~F
Committee For Economic Development, Fiscal, and .Monetary
Policy for High Ejnglgyment. (New York ; January 1962), pp. 7-8.
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Where; Ay = increase in GNP




b = Marginal Propensity to Consume
AT = amount of tax reduction
By way of contrast it can be shown, again assuming a marginal
propensity to consume of , 78 , that if instead of an $11,5 billion tax cut
we were to increase government spending by $11 5 billion, there would
be induced a $52.3 billion increase in GNP, The computation is as
follows:






= 4,55 x 11,5
= "52.3
Where; Ay = increase in GNP
k = _L_ = "Government Spending Multiplier"
1-b
A(C+G+I) = Increase in components of GNP; in this





























































"The raw data used in these computations was obtained from the
National Industrial Confe E i« The Economic Almanac, 1964,
published in cooperation with Newsweek, (New York, 1964), p 387
„
The data is based on a study performed by the Wharton School of fin-
ance and Commerce in cooperation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics
under a grant from the Ford Foundation „ Not included in the compu-
tation are the consumer units with over $10,000 disposable income.,
They represent only approximately 2 5% of the total consumer units
and it can reasonably be assumed that their effect on the Aggregate
Marginal Propensity to consume would be to decrease it slightly ==
probably no more than the difference between „ 78461 and the rounded
off figure of .78
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As can be seen from these computations an increase in government
spending would produce a greater increase in GNP than does an equal
tax cut. In other words, dollar for dollar, changes in taxes have a
weaker income-generating effect than changes in expenditures
,
For
the derivation of formulas and other information concerning the Govern-
7
ment Spending and Tax Multipliers, see Appendix I.
The question then arises, if increased government expenditures
can produce a greater increase in GNP than does a tax cut, then why-
do we choose to cut taxes instead of increasing government expenditures?
A simple answer to this question is that tax cuts are in general popular
and that government spending in unpopular,, The first question that the
average man asks when he thinks of taxes or government expenditures
is: "What does this mean to me?" The increase in his disposable
income as a result of a tax cut is real and tangible, whereas the pos-
sible benefits of increased government expenditure for, say a new dam
in another part of the country or economic aid to Somalia
,
are likely
to be vague and intangible. In this sense then the tax cut vice an
increase in government spending is a political response to the desires
of the people
.
This is not to say, however, that people always favor tax cuts.
In time of war, for example, the American people realize that they
must give up some private consumption for the war effort. Furthermore,
if resources were released, from, say, the defense program or foreign
7
For amplifying information see W. A. Salant, "Taxes, Income




aid, the people might want to spend part of such resources on public
projects such as roads, education, public health, etc„
The question of whether to cut taxes or increase government ex-
penditures is a matter of social priority . And in our society, if public
consumption projects have a lower social priority than private consump-
tion then the proper fiscal policy is one of tax reduction . Of course
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GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND TAX MULTIPLIERS1
Variables
Identify the following variables: Y , income (or net national products);
C , consumption expenditures by households; G government expenditures;
and I , net private investment. The subscript t indicates time--Y is
thus income in time t measured in days, months, years, etc.
,
from
some arbitrary (coded) starting point t= 0,
Model A
Define Y as the sum of houehold, government, and business demand
for current output. Let C be proportional to Y where the factor of propor-
tionality is designated b. The constant b, known as the Marginal Pro-
pensity to Consume, is defined as the ratio of the change in C associ-
ated with a change in Y , These two assumptions, one definitional and
the other behavioral, can be put into symbolic form as follows:
(1) Y = C + G +1w
t t t t
(2) C = bY or AC / AY = b
Solving this 2 -equation model by substituting (2) into (1) and then
simplifying yields the equilibrium result.
(3) Y
t = T^ fa + \
Reproduced with permission from an unpublished economics course
outline prepared by Dr. Tore Tjersland at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, (Fall 1962), pp. 23-26.
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The term l/l-b has a special name, the simple Keynesian multi-
plier, and a special symbol, k„ Clearly, if households either consume
or save each dollar of income, then there must be something called the
Marginal Propensity to Spend which is analagous to MPC and such that
MPC + MPS = 1. Thus, the multiplier can also be defined as the recipro-
cal of the MPS.
Example
Suppose G + I = 120 say, billions of dollars and b = 0.6.







) = 2.5 (120) = 300
Suppose that G increased by 10 . The new level of income can be com-





+G +IJ = 2.5(10) = 25
Y = "the old Y " + Y " = 300+25= 325
(ii) Y = k (G + I ) = 2.5 (120+ 10) = 325.
Modification of Model A .
Let C be a linear function of Y . The solution to the model now
becomes , where A is defined (for convenience) as the sum of the exo-



















Suppose G + I = 120 and b = 0,6 as before, and that a = 10
.
Then k = 2.5 but
Y = kA = 2.5 (130) = 325,
Clearly, autonomous increases in consumer spending (=a) have the same
effect on income as similar increases in business or government spending
That is, the multiplier effect of an increased exogenous spending is the
same, k, regardless of the source — households, firms or governments „
Whether or not this is actually true is a hotly debated question, at least
among politicians. This is obviously one of the places where Model A
could be tested to find out whether it is a good model or not.
Another Modification of Model A.
In addition to including government spending explicitly it might be
desirable to have a model which contained a variable for government
taxes. It would then be possible to derive a "tax multiplier" to compare
with the "government spending multiplier" in order to decide if changes
in taxes or government spending had the larger effect on income. All
that is required is that the consumption hypothesis be modified to read
as follows: household spending is linearly related to disposable income
where disposable income is defined as net national produce less govern-












t rh At " nr b Tt
= k A - kb T .
Suppose b= 0.6 as before so that k = k.=k =k A = 2 5. In otherg 1 a A
words, a dollar increase in government spending (to pick one) gener-







= -(-kb) = (2.5) (0.6) -1.5
In other words , a dollar change in taxes leads to a change of $1„50 in
net national income. This result, known as the balanced budget theorem
,
denies that a balanced budget is fiscally neutral; a rising but balanced
budget clearly exerts a net expansionary effect on income in this Model,
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